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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD F. vVEBSTER and CARL A. 
\VJ£BSTER, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
JOHN J. KNOP, WYCOTAI-I OIL & Civil No. 8577 
URANIUM CO., a Corporation, DOUG-
LAS J. DAVIS, GRANT SHU1fvVAY, 
JO"HN DOE, RICHARD ROE, FIRST 
ROE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
PRELIMINAHY STATEMENT 
The appellants in this case are Grant Shumwa~~ and 
Douglas J. Davis, who will be referred to either by name 
or as defendants, and respondents, Lloyd F. Webster and 
Carl A. Webster, will be referred to either by name or .as 
plaintiffs. Other parties to the action, who are no longer 
before this Court, will be referred to by nan1e. 
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This appeal arises out of a suit brought by plain-
tiffs against defendant.s to adjudge the plaintiffs owners 
of an undivided two-thirds interest in certain unpatented 
lode mining claims as against any claim the defendants 
1night assert thereto. The defendants, Shumway and 
Davis, answered by denying plaintiffs' title in the proper-
ties and, by way of an affirmative defense, sought to have 
the whole title to the Faith 11ining Claims quieted in 
them. The trial court awarded judgment in favor of 
plaintiffs and against defendants, from which judgment 
this appeal is taken. 
It should be noted, the defendants, Shumway and 
Davis, exert title only to the Faith ~fining Claims Num-
bers 1 through 10, and not to any other properties named 
in plaintiffs' Complaint. 
The plaintiffs assert an undivided two-thirds interest 
in the Faith 1\lining Clanns, X u1nbers 1 to 10, located in 
San Juan County, State of rtah. It is alleged that th8 
plaintiffs and defendant, John J. l{nop, entered into a 
grubstake agreen1ent, dated ~larch :23. 1954, and that 
pursuant to this agreen1ent the plaintiffs, on or about 
April 15, 1954, located the subject clain1s. Thereafter, 
"acting under express agree1nent with the plaintiffs, the 
defendant, John J. l{:nop, relocated said claiJ.ns on or 
about the 14th day of ~\ugust, 1n3.r· (Con1plaint, par. 3). 
By doing so the allegation is 1nade that l(nop was acting 
for and in behalf of plaintiffs. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
The grubstake agreen1ent (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) pro-
vides as follows: 
''This agreement entered into on the 23rd day 
of March, 1954, by and between JOHN J. KNOP, 
Moab, Utah, hereinafter referred to as FIRST 
PARTY and LLOYD P. WEBSTER and CARL 
A. vVEBSTER of ~Ioab, Utah, hereinafter re-
ferred to as SECOND PARTIES, 
\VITNESSETII: 
In consideration of the mutual covenants 
and agreements herein contained it is agreed as 
follows: 
1. It is mutually agreed and understood that 
SECOND PARTIES shall during the season of 
April 1, 1954 through July, 1954 devote not less 
than 50% of their time and energy to the prospect-
ing of uranium, v.anadium and other valuable 
minerals and deposits in the region known as the 
Colorado Plateau in the States of Utah and Colo-
rado and to locate, stake and record all discover-
ies deemed of sufficient value in the names of 
FIRST and SECOND PARTIES and in no other 
names. 
2. It is mutually understood and agreed that 
FIRST PARTY shall furnish to SECOND PAR-
TIES during the term of this agreement, one (1) 
jeep pick-up and one (1) jeep or similar vehicle 
or any other vehicles which FIRST PARTY may 
deem necessary and further that FIRSrr, PARTY 
shall supply to SECOND PARTIES all necessary 
food stuffs, fuel and tools necessary with the pros-
pecting to be done hereunder, and provided how-
ever, that the cost of the aforesaid items of food, 
fuel and tools shall not exceed $250.00 per month. 
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3. It is furthermore specifically understood 
and agreed that the FIRST PARTY shall advance 
all of the costs of filing the aforesaid claims 
whether filing as mineral claims or lease tracts 
under the Atomic Energy Commission regulation 
Circular 7. 
-±. It is mutually understood and agreed 
that all of the expenses of surveying shall also be 
born 1;3 by FIRST PARTY and % by SECOND 
PARTIES. 
5. The FIRST PARTY to this contract shall 
be deemed to own a lfa undivided interest and 
SECOND PARTIES shall be deemed to own a 
% undivided interest in and to the properties 
staked pursuant to the terms hereof and shall 
share any profits on the same basis. 
6. The SECOND PARTIES covenant and 
agree that they shall make no charge for time and 
labor in performance of this contract except as 
herein provided. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties here-
to have set their hands the 23rd day of March, 
1954. 
jsj John J. l{nop 
JOHN J. KNOP 
FIRST PARTY 
jsj Lolyd P. 'Yebster 
LLOYD P. "\VEBSTER 
jsj Carl A. 'Vebster 
CARL A. WEBSTER 
SECOND PARTIES 
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STATE OF, UTAII } 
COUNTY OF GRAND ss. 
On the 23rd day of March, 1954, personally 
appeared before me JOHN J. l(NOP, LLOYD P. 
WEBSTER and CARL A. vVEBSTER, who be-
ing first duly sworn, acknowledged to me that they 
executed the same. 
Is/ A. Reed Reynolds 
Notary Public, Res,iding in 
Grand Cottnty 
~Iy Commission Expires : ~Iay 31, 1955" 
It was stipulated at pre-trial between plaintiffs and 
defendants, Douglas J. Davis and Grant Shun1way, that 
a grubstake agreement was entered into between plain-
tiffs and John J. Knop on ~iarch 23, 1954 (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 1); that the Faith Claims were located on April 
15, 1954, in the names of the three parties to the grub-
stake agreernent, and recorded on April 24, 1954; that on 
.T uly 5, 1954, amended notices of location were placed on 
the Faith Clairnfi, 1 and 2, and on August 10, 1954, amend-
ed location notices were placed on Faith Clain1s 3 to 10, 
all such mnended notices naming the plaintiffs and de-
fendant Knop as loc.ators, and were recorded on August 
1~, 1954; that at the time of 1naking said original and 
amended locations, the area covered by the ~-,aith group 
was under an oil and gas lease in good standing; that 
on August 14, 1954, the Faith Claims were located by 
John J. Knop in his own name and recorded August 
27, 1954; that a Quit-Claim Deed covering the Faith 
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group from Wycotah Oil and Uranium Company, a de-
fendant herein, was executed and delivered to the de-
fendant, John fJ. Knop, on July 29, 1955; that on Julv 
26, 1955, John J. Knop executed and delivered to th~ 
defendant, Douglas J. Davis, a Quit-Claim Deed to the 
Faith group; both aforementioned Quit-Claim Deeds 
were properly recorded on August 5, 1955. An Abstract 
of Title was received as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2. 
In this regard, it was additionally stipulated at 
trial that the defendant, John J. Knop, on August 1-1:, 
1954, located the Faith Claims using then existing monu-
ments and corners. 
·upon the basis of the Complaint and the afore-
mentioned stipulated matters and evidence, the plain-
tiffs rested their case upon the premise that such was 
sufficient to establish that the location by John J. Knop 
on August 14, 1954, was pursuant to an express trust 
relationship, sufficient to establish a two-thirds interest 
in the plaintiffs, .and that the defendants, Douglas J. 
Davis and Grant Shunnvay, purchased s.aid Faith Claims 
In bad faith and with notic-e of said interest. 
vVithout adinitting nor conceding the existence of any 
trust relationship whatsoever, the defendants Douglas 
fJ. Davis and Grant Shun1way, testified regarding the 
lin1ited question whether they were bona fide purchasers 
for V1alue and without notice of plaintiffs· purported 
equitable interest. 
Grant Shumway testified In substance .as follows: 
That he is a trained geologist and has entered into a 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
general partnership with Douglas J. Davis for the pur-
pose of locating and developing mining properties (R. 
8) ; that he had occasion during the early summer of 
1955, to go into the Elk Ridge area upon a prospeeting 
expedition, and there discover the Faith group of claim::;, 
ten in number (R. 9-10); that he walked the full length 
and breadth of the claims to see that all monuments 
and corners were properly marked; that he examined 
location notices contained in two monument.s and found 
that the claims were located in the name of John J. 
Knop (R. 10-11, 22); that other pieces of paper appeared 
in these monuments, but that they were illegible and 
torn up (R. 10-11, 22, 23) ; that no development work 
had been performed upon the property, although it 
was apparent that the claims had been surveyed (R. 
10-11); that as a result of this ex•amination he pro-
ceeded, together with Douglas J. Davis, to Monticello 
where they attempted to locate John J. Knop (R. 11-12) ; 
that he and Mr. Davis examined the records contained 
in the Office of the County Recorder (R. 12-13); that 
no grubstake agreement was found (R. 13); that he 
had nothing to do with the negotiation for the purchase 
of the Faith Claims; that he had no knowledge of any 
grubstake agreement between John J. Knop .and the 
plaintiffs herein; that he had no notice or knowledge of 
any outstanding claim by or equitable interest in the 
plaintiffs (R. 16); that the claims were purchased for 
$500.00 apiece, which was a f.air and reasonable value 
for undeveloped property in this particular area (R. 
13-14); that subsequent to the purchase of the Faith 
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group, a drilling contract was let and approximatelv 
$3,000.00 worth of development work performed o~ 
the claims (R. 14-16); and, that a portion of the prop-
erty was subsequently leased to third persons by the 
defendants, Douglas J. Davis and Grant Shumway (R. 
16). :Mr. Shumway further testified that sometime in. 
the early part of September, 1955, in a Moab blueprint 
office, Lloyd Webster introduced himself and inquired 
whether Shumway knew that he, ""\Y ebster, had an agree-
ment whereby John J. Knop was supposed to pay $900.00 
for the W ebsters' purported interest in the Faith 
Claims (R. 16-17). Mr. Shumway testified that he had 
no knowledge of such alleged interest. The witness 
further stated that at a meeting during September, 1955, 
Lloyd Webster advised him that he (""\Yebster) intended 
to sue and he was sorry that Shumway and Davis were 
involved because ·•,ye (Shun1way and Davis) didn't know 
about it when we purchased the clailn.s" (R. 19). 
Thereafter, the defendant, Douglas J. Davis, was 
sworn and testified as follows: 
That at the ti1ne of the purchase of the subject 
Faith Claims, he was a partner of Grant Shun1way in 
the general business of locating and developing 1nining 
properties ( R. 31) : that he had occasion to go into the 
Elk River .an'a to locate 1nining clain1s (R. 31-32): that 
he found a group of claims located by John J. I~nop 
(R. 32): that the na1ne "John J. I\::nop .. appeared on 
the location notices exa1nined (R. 3~): that on the basis 
1()\f this infonnation, he exmnined the I""eeords at the 
Recorder's office in Monticello, and discovered three 
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groups of location notices regarding the claims, the 
latter in the name of John J. Knop and dated August 
14, 1954 (R. 33); that he located John J. Knop, quite 
by accident, and called him and arranged a meeting 
to discuss purchase of the claims (R. 34); that a meet-
ing was held between John J. Knop and Douglas J. 
Davis approximately July 15, 1955 (R. 34) ; that the 
witness was advised by Knop at said meeting that the 
latter had entered into ,a.n agreement to sell the subject 
claims to the defendant, Wycotah Oil and Uranium Com-
pany, but the deed had not been delivered (R. 34-35) ; 
that Knop advised l\Ir. Davis that a possible arrange-
ment could be worked out with \Vycot.ah whereby they 
would relinquish their rights under the unexecuted con-
tract to enable Mr. Davis to purchase the said group 
(R. 37); that a day or so later a meeting was held with 
jfr. Knop, wherein Mr. Knop showed Mr. Davis a survey 
map of the Faith Claims (Defendants' Exhibit A) desig-
nating John J. Knop as the owner (R. 34-35); that at 
this said meeting Mr. Knop explained that he located 
the Faith Claims in his own name and in his own behalf, 
.and that he had complete title to the property, unen-
cumbered by any equitable interest in the W ebsters 
(R. 36) ; that l\1r. Knop, at said meeting with Mr. Davis, 
explained his pre-existing relationship with the Webster~, 
st:ating that when the Faith Claims were originallY 
located, the location was void for the reason the property 
was situated on a valid oil and gas lease, and that the 
grubstake agreeinent that had once existed between Knop 
and the plaintiffs had terminated by its own terms when 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
he relocated, and that in any event, it had been tennin-
ated prior to that time because of disagreements arising 
between the parties thereto (R. 36, 46-47, 48); that at 
this meeting, Mr. Knop stated that his attorney, Robert 
Gibson, had advised him that he (Knop) had complete 
title and was free to convey said title to third persons 
(R. 36); that at said meeting, no mention was made of 
an agreement between the Websters and Knop dated 
November 24, 1954, and pertaining to the Faith Claims; 
that subsequent to the meeting with l\Ir. Knop on July 
15, 1955, the witness went to Denver to discuss the 
matter with Byron Xeid, an officer of Wycotah Oil 
and Uranium Company, and at this meeting, the witness 
inquired about title to the property and was informed 
that attorney Robert Gibson had prepared an Opinion 
on Title, which showed title to be in Knop (R. 36, 37); 
that on or about July 26, 1955, he went to the office 
of Robert Gibson at ~Ioab, rtah, together with John J. 
Knop, where a Contract of Sale was prepared from 
l{nop to Davis, and at said tune, a conversation was 
had with l{nop .and Gibson regarding the title to the 
property, and ~fr. Davis was told that l{nop had "good~' 
title (R. 38-40); and that prior to going to Denver, 
Colorado, the witness consulted Scott ~I. ~Iatheson, Jr., 
Attorney at Law, in Salt Lake City. rtah, regarding 
the effect of the loeations by the 'Yehsters on April 
15, 1954, over an existing and valid oil and gas lease, 
and was advised that in his opinion such locations were 
void, and was further advised that title to the subject 
property appeared to be in John J. l{nop based upon 
the locations dated August 14, 1954 (R. 4-!). 
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It was stipulated by .and between the parties hereto 
that if Robert Gibson, Attorney at Law, were called 
a.s a witness, he would testify in substance that he pre-
pared a title opinion on the Faith Claims, which opinion 
showed title to be in John J. Knop (R. 54-55). It was 
further stipulated that if Scott M. Matheson, Jr., At-
torney at Law, were called as a witness, he would testify 
that he was consulted by Douglas J. Davis regarding 
the Faith Claims, and that he advised Mr. D.avis that 
title to said claims appeared to be in John J. Knop, 
inasmuch as the earlier location and amended loc.ation 
was upon a valid oil and gas lease, and prior to the 
effective date of Public Law 585. 
Lloyd Webster testified that he gave no one 
authority to sell the Faith Claims (R. 56). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
'THE COMPE·TENT EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW TO ESTABLISH 'THAT JOHN J. KNOP 
LOCATED THE FAITH CLAIMS PURSUANT TO AN EX-
PRESS OR IMPLIED 'TRUST AGREEMENT OR RELATION-
SHIP WITH THE PLAINTIFFS. 
POINT II. 
WHERE VOID MINING CLAIMS ARE ATTEMPTED TO 
BE STAKED DURING 'THE EXISTENCE OF A GRUBSTAKE 
AGREEMENT, A PARTNER, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY 
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED UNDERSTANDING, MAY SUBSE-
QUENTLY LOCATE THE SAME CLAIMS AF'TER 1THE 
TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT IN HIS OWN BE-
HALF AND FOR HIS OWN BENEFIT. 
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POINT III. 
EVEN ASSUMING, arguendo ONLY, THAT THE 
FAITH CLAIMS WERE LOCATED PURSUANT TO A TRUST 
REL.A:TIONSHIP VESTING AN EQUITABLE INTEREST IN 
THE PLAINTIFFS, STILL THE DEFENDANTS, DOUGLAS 
J. DAVIS AND GRANT SHUMWAY, TOOK TITLE AS BONA 
FIDE PURCHASERS FOR VALUE AND WITHOUT NOTICE. 
POINT IV. 
ASSUMING, arguendo ONLY, THE EXISTENCE OF 
A VALID TRUST AGREEMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAIN-
TIFFS, UNDER THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS IN THE 
INSTANT CASE, THE PLAINTIFFS MUST LOOK FOR 
THEIR REMEDY TO THE TRUSTEE. 
ARGU~IENT 
POINT I. 
THE COMPETENT EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW TO ESTABLISH THAT JOHN J. KNOP 
LOCATED THE FAITH CLAIMS PURSUANT TO AN EX-
PRESS OR IMPLIED TRUST AGREEMENT OR RELATION-
SHIP WITH THE PLAINTIFFS. 
In the instant case, there is no argument against 
the proposition that the original location of the Faith 
group was upon land subject to the n1ineral Leasing 
Art of 1920, and was "·holly invalid and void for all 
purposes. This location was void as between the locators 
and the govern1nent, and also .as to third parties ac-
quiring rights in the land ( ll en rickson r. California 
Talc ConlJWH.If, (Cal. 19-t-2) 130 P. :2d 806). It follows 
there ean be no possession where the clain1 is void 
because .. a location to be effectual 1nust be good .at the 
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time it is made" (Beek v. Meagher, 104 U.S. 279). Like-
wise, there can be no "relocation" in the absence of a 
prior valid location (Ibid). 
It mu.st be agreed the original location w.as defective 
and absolutely void, leaving only the location by John 
J. l{nop of August 14, 1954, as the sole location upon 
the subject property. Moreover, it should be pointed 
out that the invalidity of the purported originrallocation 
is not based upon minor technical defect, e.g., improper 
monuments or lack of discovery, but is based upon a 
conceded inability to place any mining claim whatso-
ever upon the property. 
It is submitted that when John J. Knop located 
the subject mining claims, he did so in his own behalf, 
and did not thereby create in plaintiffs any beneficial 
or equitable interest in the property. 
Signific.antly, the Complaint alleges in Paragraph 
3 that the subject mining claims were located by John 
J. l{nop acting pursuant to an "express agreement" 
with the plaintjffs. It is apparent from the evidence 
that it is wholly devoid of the slightest showing of 
proof that any express agreement was entered into be-
tween plaintiffs and John J. l{nop, charging the latter 
with the responsibility of locating the Faith Claims 
for the benefit of the plaintiffs. The allegation itself 
clearly purports to mean the creation of a trust relation-
ship based upon n1utual understanding and with the 
intention of the p.arties. The absence of any evidence 
supporting this theory is manifest; indeed, had plain-
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tiff.s sought to prove its case on the theory of an express 
trust relationship, they are confronted with the Statute 
of Frauds, which provides that an interest in real prop-
erty thereby created must be evidenced in writing. (Sec-
tion 25-5-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). 
Despite the allegation of an "express agreement," 
which has wholly failed of proof, the Court determined 
that principles of equity created in plaintiffs an interest 
to the disputed mining claims, because John J. Knop 
used monuments erected by plaintiffs upon land ex-
plored by plaintiffs previously-. This, coupled with the 
evidence supplied by the grubstake agreement, further 
created a relationship of mutual trust and confidence, 
according to the Court. This conclusion presumably is 
reached upon the theory of a trust implied in law, i.e., 
a resulting trust; although not explicitly raised nor 
discussed by plaintiffs or the trial court. 
A resulting trust arises where a person makes or 
causes to be made a disposition of property under circum-
stances which raise an inference that he does not intend 
that the person taking or holding the property should 
have the beneficial interest in the property (3 ScoTT 
oN TRusTs ( 1939 Ed.) ·~-1:041). A resulting trust, unlike 
an express trust, is based upon rule, presumption or 
inference of law and not an expression of intention by 
the trustor ( 5-! AM. J uR., 1,rusts. §187). Both express 
and i1nplied trusts involve intention to create a trust, 
but in the case of a resulting trust the intention is im-
plied or presumed in law, the chief source of such impli-
cation or presu1nption being a valuable consideration 
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(5-± AM. JuR., Trusts, §194). This rule is well stated 
in -± Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th Ed.) § 1031, 
as follows: 
"***The equitable theory of consideration, 
*** is the source and underlying principle of the 
entire class ****. In such case a trust is implied 
or results in favor of the person for whom the 
equitable interest is assumed to have been in-
tended, and whom equity deems to be the real 
owner. This person is the one from whom the 
consideration actually comes, or who represents 
or is identified in right with the consideration; 
the resulting tru.st follows or goes with the real 
consideration." 
To establish a resulting trust, plaintiffs must prove not 
only that they furnished money for acquiring the prop-
erty but that the money or the consideration was in 
fact so applied. (Brown v. Liken (N.M. 1933) 22 P. 2d 
848); See lJicDennott li. Sher (N.J\L 1955) 280 P. 2d 
660). 
Grubstake agreements, whether giving rights in 
trust relationships, or being enforced by their own 
terms, must be treated in like manner as other contracts, 
and must be supported by satisfactory proof of all the 
essential elements-especially con.sideration ( 40 CoRPUS 
JuRis, J\1:ines, page 1154; see Cisna v. Mallory, (C.C. 
Wash. 1898) 84 Fed. 851). 3 Lindley on Mines ( 3rd 
Ed.) §858, places emphasis upon ordinary contract re-
quirements, stating as follows: 
"Should the prospector during the life of the 
contract locate in his own name to the exclusion 
of the one supplying the capit1al, the title thus 
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accruing to him would be held in trust for his 
associate in the joint venture to the extent of his 
interest, not necessarily on the theory of partner-
ship, but for the reason that his advances con-
tributed to the acquisition of the property.~' 
(Citing Meylette v. Brennan, 20 Colo. 2-!2, 38 
Pac. 75; Byrne v. Knight, 12 Cal. App. 56, 106 
Pac. 593, 594; Lockhardt v. Leeds, 195 lr.s. -±27, 
25 S. Ct. 76). 
The burden rests on the plaintiffs to establish a 
fiduciary relationship essential to create the purported 
trust (Renshazr L Tracy Loan & Trust, 87 r. 359, 35 
P. 2d 298, modified 49 P. 2d 403; Botkin 1:. Pyle (Colo. 
1932) 1-± P. 2d 187; Jl,faynard 1:. Taylor (Okla. 1939) 
91 P. 2d 649; Zioncheck v. Xadeau (V\Tash. 1938) 81 P. 
2d 811). The e·vidence sustaining a resulting trust in 
real property n1ust be clear, convincing, definite, une-
quivocal, and not conflicting on material points, as to 
the agreement or understanding upon which the prop-
erty was obtained. (See 89 C.J.S., Trusts, §137; Cham-
bers v. Emery, 13 F. 37-+. 45 Pac. 19~: .l-Iansen r. Han-
sen, 110 TT. 272, 171 P. 2d 39~). It is subnlitted that 
the evidence wholly f.ails to support this burden. The 
trust agree1nent, whether expre~s or ilnplied, alleged 
to exi ~t between the plaintiffs and l{:nop, could onl~­
have one evidentiary source - the grubstake agTe~·­
Inent. \VhPn th i~ agree1nent is strictly construed, the 
following factors are apparent: 
1. The grnhstnkP agree1nent 1nakes no reference 
to .nn~· trn8t obligation of the defendant l(nop. 
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:2. The grubstake agreen1ent had ended by its tenns 
(July, 1954) prior to the date of the first valid location 
of the Faith Claims. 
3. The grubstake agree1nent provided expressly that 
the Websters were to locate all n1ining claims pursuant 
to the contract. 
-!. The .agree1nent provided that John J. Knop was 
only to supply the grubstake. 
The most significant aspect of the grubstake agree-
ment i.s the complete absence of any obligation on Knop's 
part to locate the Faith Claims or any other claims 
on behalf of the plaintiffs. The outstanding mining 
authority, 3 Lindley on Mines (3rd Ed.) § 858, states 
that it is essential to a right in property under a grub-
stake contract that such property be acquired by means 
of the grubstake furnished pursuant to such contract. 
Again in 40 Corpus Juris, Jl;fines, at page 1154, it is 
stated that equity will not enforce a trust in a 1nining 
claim located hy an alleged partner under a contract 
to do so, when the claim was in fact, not located with 
partnership capital. (Craw v. Wilson, 22 Nev. 385, -10 
Pac. 1076). 
It is apparent frmn the grubstake agreement that 
.John ~J. Knop was free to locate claims as he wished 
and in his own behalf without being required to account 
to the plaintiffs for such property (See Kahn v. 
Smelting Company, 102 U.S. 641). 
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Setting aside for the moment the grubstake agree-
ment, an examination might be made of the other evi-
dence to seek an implied intention to create the purport-
ed trust. We find that Knop employed the corners placed 
on the ground by plaintiffs. These were doubtless 
changed with survey. This feature alone remains the 
on]~· peg upon which a trust relationship could arguably 
be based; but, this single factor does not constitute clear, 
convincing, definite and unequivocal evidence of the 
quality and quantity sufficient to create a trust in real 
property (Chambers 1.:. Emery, Supra; Hansen 1.:. Han-
sen, Supra). It is hardly .sufficient to show, as plain-
tiffs aver, that Knop located the Faith Claims acting 
pursuant to the intention of all the parties. It does not 
follow by any exercise of the imagination that Knop was 
charged with any duty subsequently to locate the claims 
on behalf of hin1self and the plaintiffs. X or, indeed, can 
implication and conjecture supply a causal relation be-
tween l{nop's location and the prior agreement and acts 
perforn1ed thereunder. 
POINT II. 
WHERE VOID MINING CLAIMS ARE ATTEMPTED TO 
BE STAKED DURING THE EXISTENCE OF A GRUBSTAKE 
AGREEMENT, A PARTNER, IN THE ABSEN.CE OF ANY 
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED UNDERSTANDING, MAY SUBSE-
QUENTLY LOCATE THE SAl\IE CLAIMS AFTER THE 
TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT IN HIS OWN BE-
HALF AND FOR HIS OWN BENEFIT. 
'rhi.s is not the case wlu:~re co-tenants of re·al property 
enter into a rPlationship of trust, one to the other, so as 
1 o pn'(·lwh~ one co-tenant fr01n g.aining son1e advantage 
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with respect to the joint property over his co-tenant; 
!~. nor where joint tenants are acting in hostility with refer-
~t ence to the joint estate; nor where one of several joint 
~a~ owners of mining claims has sought to amend the location 
~Q- to his own benefit, to secure a patent for his own benefit, 
~: or to relocate the clai1n for his own benefit (See Speed v. 
JllcCarthy (S.D.) 77 N.vV. 590; Kline v. Wright (D. C. 
I d. 1930) -t2 F. 2d 927; Yarwood v. Johnson, et al., 29 
'Vash. 643, 70 Pac. 123; Henrickson v. California Talc 
Co., (Cal., 1942), 130 P. 2d 806). 
None of the evidence produced by plaintiffs in this 
case tends to show that John J. Knop located the Faith 
Claims pursuant to an express or implied agreement with 
plaintiffs, nor during the existence of any grubstake or 
prospecting .agreement. Paramount consideration should 
be given to the following uncontradicted evidence fortify-
jng the allegation of defendants, Shumway and Davis, 
that the claims were located by ICnop as his own property 
and free fr01n any entanglement with plaintiffs: 1) The 
Faith group located by John J. Knop, alone, and in 
his own name; 2) The claims were located after the termi-
nation of the grubstake agree1nent; 3) This location was 
achieved by the use of Knop's own money, tin1e and ef-
fort; -l) The claims were surveyed by Knop and at his 
expense; 5) The claims rem.ained on the County records 
as Knop's sole property; and, 6) Knop held himself out 
to the world as the sole owner and conveyed title as such. 
Each of these unrefuted items belies and negatives the 
allegation that the claims were located on behalf of the 
plaintiffs. The only direct .and substantial evidence be-
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fore the Court showed Knop to be the locator and the 
owner of the whole interest in the real property. If the 
facts are otherwise they were not produced by plaintiffs. 
40 Cor pus Juris, IV! ines, page 1155, makes express 
reference to our precise fact situation, stating: 
"It is essential to a right in property under a 
grubstake contract that such property should be 
acquired by means of the grubstake furnished and 
pursuant to a grubstake contract, [Citing cases], 
as well as during its existence ... " (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
The en1phasized portion of the foregoing is mnply foot-
noted by authorities holding that where there has been no 
concealment, discoveries by individual nwmbers of a 
fonner prospecting partnership (grubstake agreement) 
are not partnership property, although made on grounds 
prospected during its existence (Re Laidley (1910) :JI.C. 
( 
1
• -!-78) : and e.ases holding that where claims staked 
during the existence of a prospecting partnership turn 
out to be invalid and are canceled or lapsed, one of the 
partner:-: who subsequently res takes the san1e after the 
ter1nination of the partnership, and 1naintains and pro-
tects them solely by his O\Vn labor and n1oney. is entitled 
to the entire interest therein (Be Libby, (1909) :JI.C.C. 
-t--tl; Rc SC,lfm')lfr~ (1909) ~I.C.C. -t~l: Re Greene. (1908) 
1\l.C.C. :2:2:n. The rule is state(l dearly in Iiolliugs1forth 
v. Tuft.-.·. ():2 Colo. :25G, lG:2 Pac. 155, 159, as follow~: 
"The law is well settled that the partnership 
relation between the parties engaged in acquiring 
1nining properties for their joint benefit n1nst ex-
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ist at the ti1ne such properties .are acquired by one 
of the parties to such an arrangement to entitle 
the other to an interest therein." 
ln Morrow v. Coast Land Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d 92, 
84 P. :2d 301, it wa.s held in an action by claimants against 
an oil well driller, that although the clain1ants and the 
driller had entered into a prospecting ~agreement with 
respect to the land in question, and had even commenced 
drilling for oil, but had subsequently stopped work and 
allowed the agreement to terminate, that the driller was 
entitled to obtain a pennit in his own name, and that 
claimants were not entitled to share therein. 
And, in Bradley v. Andrews, 91 Colo. 378, 14 P. 2d 
1086, the claimants were to supply money and defendant 
was to prospect and locate oil leases. The claimants 
failed to supply the money and defendant called the con-
tract off. Later the defendant interested a third party 
in the leases and the claimants attempted to exert a one-
half interest. It was held that before any person who 
supplies 1noney, etc., may share under .a prospecting 
(grubstake) agreement, the property n1ust have been 
acquired during the life of the agreement. In that case, 
the leases were acquired after the contract expired. The 
Court .added further: 
" ... When the contract was terminated both 
parties were free to proceed as they saw fit. 
Bradley availed hi1nself of his opportunity; An-
drews neglected his. Now that Bradley, after an 
expenditure by him .and his new associate of con-
siderable time and money, is reaping the fruits of 
his industry, Andrews seeks to take away from 
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Bradley, a substantial part thereof. He ought not, 
and under law he cannot succeed in this attempt." 
In a similar case, the plaintiffs and defendants en-
tered into a prospecting agreement to acquire mining 
claims, and each of the parties was to share equally. 
One of the defendants and a party plaintiff located two 
mining properties within two weeks of a subsequent 
agreement mutually to abandon and dissolve the pros-
pecting agreement. Seven days after the termination 
of the agreement the defendants and one of the plaintiffs 
relocated the same claims and erected proper monuments. 
Thereafter, the plaintiffs by their action sought to have 
defendants conYey to then1 their alleged interest in the 
property, contending that the partners oceupied a fidu-
ciar~- relationship to one another, that the subsequent 
location, after the dissolution of the agreement, should 
be treated as a cmnpletion of the prior attempted loca-
tions, and that a trust should be imposed in their favor. 
The court rejected the contention of plaintiffs, concluding 
that defendants wen' not trustees. When the parties 
nmtually agreed to dissolve the agreen1ent, and having 
done ~o, the plaintiffs n1ight be concluded to ha\e aban-
doned all interest in the property. The court further 
pointed out that uo duty re1nained when the agreement 
wa~ t<>rminatPd to con1plete .any locations. and that plain-
t j l'f~ ( otlJpr than tlH' one who joined in the subsequent lo-
<·at ion~) could not be cmnpelled to accept a conveyance 
nor could they be charged with the expenses of location 
( J>apc. rt a!. v. Summers, ct a!. ,70 Cal. 1:?1. 1:? Pac. 1:20: 
~<'<' alfio .Jeuuin.rf·"' Y. Riclwrds, 10 Colo. ~)~);), 15 Pac. (1/1. 
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where the court refused to create a trust in mining prop-
erty prospected during life of agreement and located by 
one party after the termination of agreement). 
The instant case is not unlike the above-cited au-
thorities. The grubstake .agreement between plaintiffs 
and defendant, Knop, had clearly tenninated when the 
latter placed the only good and valid location upon the 
Faith properties. Plaintiffs and Knop were free to pro-
ceed as they wished. No residual duties remained accord-
ing to the proof. nloreover, there is nothing to show that 
Knop did not act in the uhnost good faith when he located 
the properties and recorded the same for public scrutiny 
and inspection. And, again, it must be rea.sserted for 
the unmistakable and affirmative weight of the fact, 
that no substantial advances of the vVebsters contributed 
to the acquisition of the property. The law treats inter-
ests in real property with the greatest circumspection 
and caution, and will not allow a claim therein to be pre-
mised on speculation and conjecture, and especially will 
not sanction the creation of a trust in real property upon 
evidence which is not clear, convincing, definite, unequi-
vocal, and which is conflicting on material points. The 
rule which forbids a co-tenant from acquiring and assert-
ing an adverse title against his companions because of the 
mutual trust and confidence which is supposed to exist 
can have no application where the facts show that no co-
tenancy ever existed in the property and the locator acted 
only in conformity with federal law to secure an interest 
in the disputed property (liodgson v. Federal O·il & De-
velopment Co., 274 U.S. 15, 71 L. ed. 901,47 Sup. Ct. 502). 
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POINT III. 
EVEN ASSUMING, arguendo ONLY, THAT THE 
FAITH CLAIMS WERE LOCATED PURSUANT TO A TRUST 
RELATIONSHIP VESTING AN EQUITABLE INTEREST IN 
THE PLAINTIFFS, STILL THE DEFENDANTS, DOUGLAS 
J. DAVIS AND GRANT SHUMWAY, TOOK TITLE AS BONA 
FIDE PURCHASERS FOR VALUE AND WITHOUT NOTICE. 
It unifonnly has been held that a bona fide purchaser 
for value fro1n a trustee holding under an in1plied trust, 
and without notice, takes free of any equities in the bene-
ficiary of the trust (Peterson v. Peterson, 112 -ctah 554. 
190 P. 2d 135). Stated differently~ anyone to whom prop-
C>rty is transferred in violation of the trust holds the 
property as an involuntary trustee under such trust, un-
less he purchased it in good faith and for valuable con-
sideration (Sampson Y. Bn~:der (Cal. 19-±1) 118 P. 2d ~8: 
see also Rafftery v. Kirkpatrick (Cal. 1938) 85 P. 2d 
1-1-7). In this regard it has been held, in a California de-
cision, that a person who purchases a nrining claim in 
good faith and for a yaluable consideration is not re-
sponsible to plaintiff ·who has rights under a grubstake 
agreement (1\.imlwll v. San Francisco Superior Court. 
3R Cal. App. 7f)l. 177 Pac. 488). 
It might be asked: Does the f.act that defendant 
Davis took a Quit-Clai1n Deed frmn John J. Knop put 
hi1n on notice that there 1nay be unrecorded instru1nents 
or agTPC'nwnts effecting title or constituting encum-
bnuw<'s on the pro pert~-~ The Supre1ne Court of the 
I 'nih,d ~tatPs in Jloelle ,-.Sherwood, 1-t-S r.~. :21.13 S. Ct. 
-!:2(i, -+:2!), has :1 nswered pia in I~- in the negatiYe, as follows: 
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"There is in this country no difference, in 
their efficacy and operative force, between con-
veyances in the form of release and quitclaim, and 
those in the form of grant, bargain and sale. *** 
If in either case the grantee takes the deed with 
notice of an outstanding conveyance of the prenl-
ises by the grantor, or of the execution by him of 
obligations to make such conveyance of the premi-
ses, or to create a lien thereon, he takes the prop-
erty subject to the operation of such outstanding 
conveyance and obligation, and cannot claim pro-
tection against them as a bona fide purchaser. 
But in either case, if the grantee takes the deed 
without notice of such outstanding conveyance or 
obligation respecting the property, or notice of 
facts which, if followed up, would lead to .a knowl-
edge of such outstanding conveyance or equity, 
he is entitled to protection as a bona fide pur-
chaser upon showing that the consideration stipu-
lated has been paid, and that such consideration 
was a fair price for the claim or interest desig-
nated. The mere fact that in either case the con-
veyance is unaccompanied by any warranty of 
title, and against encumbrances or liens, does not 
raise a presumption of the want of bona fides on 
the part of the purchaser in the transaction." 
·rhi:-~ r.ase disaffinned prior decisions stating that a quit-
rlaim grantee could not be a bona fide purchaser. See 
also to this effect, Aitken v. Lane (l\Iont. 1939) 92 P. 2d 
628. 
Certainly, under the facts presented in the instant 
case no notice could be considered to flow frorn the rnen~ 
existence of an unrecorded grubstake agreernent defining 
rights of the parties thereto. Frorr1 the undisputed evi-
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dence presented on behalf of defendants, Davis and 
Shumway, it is equally apparent that they had no knowl-
edge that the plaintiffs had or were exerting any interest 
in the Faith Claims, arising from the earlier grubstake 
agreement. There remains, but a single factor upon 
'"'hich plaintiffs rely to rebut the overwhelming and pre-
ponderant evidence of good faith and purchase without 
notice-the recordation of patently void location notices. 
As a general proposition, one who deals with real 
property is charged with notice of what is shown by the 
records of the County Recorder of the county in which 
the property is situated (Crompton v. Jenson, 78 r. 55, 
10, 1 P. 2d 2-12). However, a purchaser need not take 
notice of recorded instrmnents not in his chain of title 
(-+Bogert, Trusts and Trustees,§ 893, n. S:Z: Smitlz \. 
"~illiams, (Okla. 1928) 269 Pac. 1067). So, here, it can 
properly be argued that the location notices recorded 
prior to the effective date of Public. Law 585 and showing 
the clai1ns to be on valid oil and gas leases were wholly 
voi<l and invalid and completely outside the ehain of title 
in tlH' Faith Clain1s. 
This proposition is buttressed in the light of the gen-
Pral principal that ·'the record of a Yoid instrument is of 
no <' ffeet wl1a 1 ~opver... (-I-~) .-\~1. J rR .. Record and Re-
('Ording Law~.~ Hl;J ). It i~ stated further: 
"No l<>gal rffpet i:s produeed upon the rights 
of the pa rtiP~. or of subsequent purchasers or 
<'ll<'lllllhranet>r~. h~- the reeording of a void in-
~trmuenL ,..* .. (-l-5 Al\r. JFR .• Supra. Section 106). 
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In ~llosley v. 1lfagnolia Pet1·oleu1n Co. (N.l\L 1941) 114 
P. 3d 7 40, it is stated: 
"Only valid instrun1ents are authorized to be 
filed and recorded, of which purchasers are 
charged with notice.'' 
In an Idaho decision, where a deed executed by grantor's 
attorney in fact was recorded prior to the filing and 
recording of the power of attorney, it was held that al-
though this did not necessarily render the deed void 
as between the parties, it did not constitute notice to sub-
sequent purchasers of the land (Hunt v . . ZII[ cDonald (ld. 
1944) 149 P. 2d 792). The Court stated in IJ;Iadden v . 
. Alpha Hardware & Supply Co., (Cal. 1954), 274 P. 2d 
705, 707: 
"It is true that recordation of an instrument 
is constructive notice of the contents thereof to 
subsequent purchasers, and that such knowledge 
is conclusive; however, this rule contemplates 
only conveyances by one having leg,al title to the 
property involved. *** the two quitclaim deeds 
which Cassidy subsequently negotiated, each of 
which was void on its face, could not affect the 
title, and gave no notice to anyone." 
In our case the only valid instruments were recorded 
by John J. Knop. In this regard Section 57-1-6, UTAH 
ConE ANNOTATED, 1953, provides as follows: 
"Every conveyance of real estate, and every 
instrument of writing setting forth an agreement 
to convey any real estate or whereby any real 
estate may be .affected, to operate as notice to 
third persons shall be proved or acknowledged and 
certified in the manner prescribed by this title and 
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recorded in the office of the recorder of the coun-
ty in which such real estate is situated, bnt shall 
be valid and binding between the i)arties thereto 
without such proofs, acknowledgement, certifica-
tion or record, and as to all other persons wh~ 
have had actual notice. :K either the fact that an 
instrun1ent, recorded as herein provided, recites 
only a nominal consideration, nor the fact that the 
grantee in such instrun1ent is designated as trus-
tee, or that the conveyance otherwise purports 
to be in trust without naming the beneficiaries or 
stating the terms of the trust, shall operate to 
charge any third person with notice of the inter-
est of any person or persons not named in such 
instrument or of the grantor or grantors; but the 
grantee may convey the fee or such lesser inter-
est as was conveyed to him by such instrument 
free and clear of all claims not disclosed by the 
instrument or by an instrument recorded as herein 
provided setting forth the nan1es of the benefici-
aries, specifying the interest claimed and describ-
ing the property charged with such interest." 
Thi;;; portion of our Code precludes an)~ notice of third 
part~- equities arising frmn the recordation of the ~\ugnst 
1 +. 10;)-1-, location h~- John J. I~nop. the purported trustee. 
Di~r0garding, for tlw nlmnent, the clear ilnport of 
the accepted dnctrine of law regarding notice afforded 
hy Yoid instrunwnb, and assn1ning that a grubstake 
:1 "T<'<'IIH'n t wa~ Oil<'<' known bv defendants to exi8t, vet the 
''"""" . . . 
<l<'f<>ndnnt~. D:n·i~ and Slnunway. acted in good faith, 
emplo~·<'d dtw dilig<'llet>, and acquired title as bona fide 
pur<·hn~<'r~ for Y.n hw. 'rhe following indicia of good 
l'nith supplied by the evidence exe1nplif~- this result: 
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1) 11he defendants went upon the ground and 
walked the entire area of the clain1s, and de-
termined they were located by John J. Knop. 
2) The exan1ination of the property revealed 
that plaintiffs were not in possession, nor 
had they performed development work. 
3) The defendants examined the record entries 
at the office of the County Recorder and de-
terrnined that the only valid location was in 
the name of John J. Knop, alone. 
-!) The defendant Davis 1nade complete inquiry 
of Knop regarding the latter's title and was 
advised that he (I{nop) located the claims in 
his own behalf and that there were no out-
standing equitable interests in third persons. 
;) ) The defendant Davis made inquiry of Robert 
Gibson, Attorney at Law, and was advised 
that a title opinion had been prepared by him 
pertaining to the Faith Claims, and that John 
J. l{nop had a good and unencumbered title. 
6) The defendant Davis made inquiry of Scott 
l\L :Matheson, Jr., Attorney at Law, and was 
advised that the prior mining locations on 
valid oil and gas leases were void and that 
.John J. Knop appeared to have valid title. 
7) The defendants paid a reasonable considera-
tion for the Faith Claims. 
8) The defendants, after making the foregoing 
exhaustive inquiry, and after purchasing the 
property for a substantial consideration, then 
went upon the land and spent considerable 
additional sums for drilling and development. 
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One of these factors standing alone might be deemed in-
sufficient to constitute diligence, but when each is con-
sidered it is apparent that the defendants Davis and 
Shu1nway exerted every reasonable effort to ascertain 
the true condition of the title, and only after the exercise 
of a plethora of caution they proceeded to acquire the 
deed from John J. Knop. To deny this title would be a 
grossly unfair penalty for unusual, persevering and 
laudable diligence. 
If the facts are as plaintiffs allege, they prejudiced 
their standing in this 1natter by failing to make the slight-
est effort to correct the public records so as to protect 
innocent third persons against deception and reliance 
thereon. That this was not done shows how tenuous their 
clai1n must be. 
POINT IV. 
ASSUMING, arguendo ONLY. THE EXISTENCE OF 
A VALID TRUST AGREEMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAIN-
TIFFS, UNDER THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS IN THE 
INSTANT CASE, THE PLAINTIFFS ~IlTST LOOK FOR 
THEIR REMEDY TO THE TRUSTEE. 
\ rherp a trn~t<'C'. holding under a deed absolute on its 
l':u·<'. conn'~·s to an innocent purchaser. the cestai que 
trust cannot disturb the title, but n1ust follmv the pro-
<'<'<'ds of sa]p in the hands of the trustee \Cole r. Thomp-
son (C. C. \Y. Ya. 1909) 169 F. 129). LikPwise. in this case 
t h<' pia inti fl's .are obliged, assu1ning the existence of the 
purported trust. to sPPk their re1nedy against the de-
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fendant John J. Knop, inasmuch as title to the property 
rests securely in the laps of defendants, Davis and Shum-
way. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the con1petent evi-
dence of record is insufficient as .a matter of law to sus-
tain the finding of the trial court that John J. Knop lo-
cated the Faith Claims pur.suant to an express agreement 
or an implied duty to do so in behalf of plaintiffs; that 
John J. Knop, who conveyed title to the defendants, 
D.avis and Shumway, was free to locate the subject min-
ing claims in his own name and own behalf after the ter-
mination of the grubstake agreement; and, even assum-
jn~ that plaintiffs did sustain their burden with clear, 
convincing, unequivocal .and definite evidence, still the 
defendants, Davis and Shumway, took full and complete 
title as bona fide purchasers for value and without 
notice. 
Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that this 
Honorable Court should reverse the judgment of the 
lower court, and should order that the defendants, Doug-
las J. Davis and Grant Shumway, have judgment against 
plaintiffs for the following: 
(a) That the Court decree that defendants, Douglas 
J. Davis and Grant Shumway, are the owners of all right, 
title and interest to the Inining claims, Faith numbers 
1 through 10, and entitled to the possession of said prop-
erty and the holding thereof. 
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(b) That all other parties to this action be ad-
judged as having no estate, right, title or interest in said 
mining claim_s, or any part thereof, and that they be for-
ever debarred from asserting any estate, right, title or 
interest of any nature in or to said property .adverse to 
these defendants. 
(c) That said defendants have and recover their. 
costs of suit herein expended. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FOWLER & MATHESON 
Counsel for Defetulants and 
.AppeUants Douglas J. Davis 
and Grant Shumway 
628 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, L' tah 
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